Abstract. A Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) allows users to specify the access policies without having to know the identities of users. In this paper, we contribute by proposing an ABE scheme which enables revoking corrupted users. Given a key-like blackbox, our system can identify at least one of the users whose key must have been used to construct the blackbox and can revoke the key from the system. This paper extends the work of Liu and Wong to achieve traitor revocability. We construct an Augmented Revocable CP-ABE (AugR-CP-ABE) scheme, and describe its security by message-hiding and index-hiding games. Then we prove that an AugR-CP-ABE scheme with message-hiding and indexhiding properties can be transferred to a secure Revocable CP-ABE with fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability. In the proof for index-hiding, we divide the adversary's behaviors in two ways and build direct reductions that use adversary to solve the D3DH problem. Our scheme achieves the sub-linear overhead of O( √ N ), where N is the number of users in the system. This scheme is highly expressive and can take any monotonic access structures as ciphertext policies.
Ciphertext
Private Key Public Key Pairing Computation On Prime Revocation Order of the Size Size Size in Decryption Order Groups Groups [13] 2l + 17 √ N |S| + 4 |U| + 3 + 4 √ N 2|I| + 10 × × p1p2p3 [16] 6l + 3 + 46 √ N 6|S| + 12 24|U| + 22 + 14 √ N 6|I| + 30 √ × p this paper 6l + 3 + 46 √ N 6|S| + 9 + 3 √ N 24|U| + 22 + 23 √ N 6|I| + 30 √ √ p 1 Let l be the size of an access policy, |S| the size of the attribute set of a private key, |U| the size of the attribute universe, and |I| the number of attributes in a decryption key that satisfies a ciphertext's access policy. blackbox/device which keeps the embedded decrypt keys and algorithms hidden, Liu et al. [13] proved that the blackbox traceable CP-ABE scheme supports fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable in the standard model, where fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability means that the number of colluding users in constructing a decryption blackbox/device is not limited and can be arbitrary. This scheme is fully secure in the standard model and highly expressive (i.e. supporting any monotonic access structures). It should be observed that a tracing system is not designed to protect the encrypted content. It is used to distinguish the compromised users from other legitimate users, which means the corrupted user/key is still remained in the system and an effective blackbox is likely to be produced with these corrupted keys in the wild market. The exposed compromised users need to leave or be removed from the system to avoid incurring more losses. When any of these happens, the corresponding user keys should be revoked. We added the revocability in the scheme so that we can remove the compromised keys as needed. We focus on achieving direct revocation in traceable CP-ABE system. In a direct revocation mechanism, it does not need any periodic key updates and it does not affect any non-revoked users either. A system-wide revocation list could be made public and revocation could be taken into effect promptly as the revocation list could be updated immediately once a key is revoked. Specifically, we generate Q i , which is a part of ciphertext, with a non-revoked index listR. When decrypting, we first recoverK i,j which has a common item h j ∈Ri h j with Q i if they share a consistent revocation list R. ThenK i,j is used in the following decryption process. To avoid a further loss, the revocation list should be updated timely once corrupted users are found. For the security proof for message-hiding, we re-construct the Semi-functional Keys by replacing h with hh j , which can realize revocability, and adding the random item K i,j,j accordingly. As a contrast, the random items for Semi-functional Ciphertexts remain the same, which is irrelevant to the revocability. For the security proof for index-hiding, we have two ways for adversary to take and add more sub-cases in Case II which make the security proof a non-trivial work. In this paper, We continue our work on prime order groups as an extension for [16] .
Our results
It has been shown (e.g. in [6, 9] ) that the constructions on composite order groups will result in significant loss of efficiency and the security will rely on some non-standard assumptions (e.g. the Subgroup Decision Assumptions) and an additional assumption that the group order is hard to factor. The previous work in [16] achieves better security than the scheme in [13] , which is constructed on composite order groups. In this paper, we add the revocability in [16] and prove it highly expressive and fully secure in the standard model. On the efficiency aspect, this new scheme achieves the same efficient level as in [16] , i.e. the overhead for the fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability is in O( √ N ), where N is the number of users in a system. Table 1 compares this new scheme with the previous work on blackbox traceable CP-ABE [13] and the traceable CP-ABE on prime order group but without revocability [16] . We only change the size of keypair as we need add revocation items in the key. Both the ciphertext and the pairing computation in decryption are kept unchanged. This implies both this new scheme and [16] have better security than the scheme in [13] , although all of them are fully secure in the standard model and have overhead in O( √ N ).
Related Work. In the literature, several revocation mechanisms have been proposed in the context of CP-ABE. In [21] , Sahai et al. proposed an indirect revocation mechanism, which requires an authority to periodically broadcast a key update information so that only the non-revoked users can update their keys and continue to decrypt messages. In [1] , Attrapadung and Imai proposed a direct revocation mechanism, which allows a revocation list to be specified directly during encryption so that the resulting ciphertext cannot be decrypted by any decryption key which is in the revocation list even though the associated attribute set of the key satisfies the ciphertext policy. For ABE scheme, in [13] Liu et al. defined a 'functional' CP-ABE that has the same functionality as the conventional CP-ABE (i.e. having all the appealing properties of the conventional CP-ABE), except that each user is assigned and identified by a unique index, which will enable the traceability of traitors. Liu et al. also defined the security and the fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability for such a 'functional' CP-ABE. Furthermore, Liu et al. defined a new primitive called Augmented CP-ABE (AugCP-ABE) and formalized its security using message-hiding and index-hiding games. Then Liu et al. proved that an AugCP-ABE scheme with message-hiding and index-hiding properties can be directly transferred to a secure CP-ABE with fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability. With such a framework, Liu et al. obtained a fully secure and fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable CP-ABE scheme by constructing an AugCP-ABE scheme with message-hiding and index-hiding properties. In [16] , Liu et al. obtain a prime order construction and it will be tempting to bring the revocation into [16] as a practical enhancement and implementation. In this paper, we leverage the revocation idea from [15] .
Outline. In this paper, we follow the same framework in [16] . In particular, in Section 2, we propose a definition for CP-ABE supporting key-like blackbox traceability and direct revocation. the definition is 'functional', namely each decryption key is uniquely indexed by k ∈ {1, . . . , N } and given a key-like decryption blackbox, the tracing algorithm Trace can return the index k of a decryption key which has been used for building the decryption blackbox. In our direct revocation definition, the Encrypt algorithm takes a revocation list R ⊆ {1, . . . , N } as an additional input so that a message encrypted under the (revocation list, access policy) pair (R, A) would only allow users whose (index, attribute set) pair (k, S) satisfies (k ∈ [N ] \ R) AND (S satisfies A) to decrypt. In Section 3, we revisit the definitions and security models of Augmented Revocable CP-ABE (AugR-CP-ABE for short) from [15] . We refer to the 'functional' CP-ABE in Section 2 as Revocable CP-ABE (R-CP-ABE for short), then extend the R-CP-ABE to AugR-CP-ABE, which will lastly be transformed to a key-like blackbox traceable R-CP-ABE. More specifically, we define the encryption algorithm of AugR-CP-ABE as Encrypt A (PP, M, R, A,k) which takes one more parameterk ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1} than the original one in R-CP-ABE. This also changes the decryption criteria in AugR-CP-ABE in such a way that an encrypted message can be recovered using a decryption key SK k,S , which is identified by index k ∈ {1, . . . , N } and associated with an attribute set S, only if (k ∈ [N ] \ R) ∧ (S satisfies A) ∧ (k ≥k). In Section 4 we propose our AugR-CP-ABE construction on prime order groups and prove that our AugR-CP-ABE construction is message-hiding and index-hiding in the standard model. As a result, we obtain a fully secure and fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable R-CP-ABE scheme on prime order groups.
To construct the AugR-CP-ABE, we continue our work in [16] and leverage the revocation idea from [15] . In particular, besides achieving the important features for practicality, such as revocation, high expressivity and efficiency, the construction is proved secure and traceable in the standard model. The message-hiding game is a typical semantic security game and is based on that for conventional CP-ABE [10, 11] , where the revocation list R is always empty. It is clear that such a CP-ABE system [10, 11] has the following properties: fully collusion-resistant security, meaning that several users should not be able to decrypt a message that none of them are individually granted to access, fine-grained access control on encrypted data, and efficient one-to-many encryption.
It is worth noticing that, as pointed in [13] , in the definition of the game: (1) the adversary is allowed to specify the index of the private key when it makes key queries for the attribute sets of its choice, i.e., for t = 1 to Q, the adversary submits (index, attribute set) pair (k t , S kt ) to query a private key for attribute set S kt , where Q ≤ N , k t ∈ [N ], and k t = k t ∀1 ≤ t = t ≤ Q (this is to guarantee that each user/key can be uniquely identified by an index); and (2) for k t = k t we do not require S kt = S k t , i.e., different users/keys may have the same attribute set. We remark that these two points apply to the rest of the paper.
Blackbox Traceability
Now we define the traceability against key-like decryption blackbox. A key-like decryption blackbox D can be viewed as a probabilistic circuit that takes as input a ciphertext CT R,A and outputs a message M or ⊥, and such a decryption blackbox does not need to be perfect, namely, we only require it to be able to decrypt with non-negligible success probability. In particular, a key-like decryption blackbox D is described by a (revocation list, attribute set) pair (R D , S D ) and a non-negligible probability value (i.e. 0 ≤ ≤ 1 is polynomially related to λ), and advertised that for any ciphertext generated under the (revocation list, access policy) pair (R, A), if ((S D satisfies A) AND ([N ] \ R) ∩ ([N ] \ R D ) = ∅) can be satisfied by S D and R D , this blackbox D can decrypt the corresponding ciphertext with probability at least . Specifically, once a blackbox is found being able to decrypt ciphertext, we can regard it as a key-like decryption blackbox with the corresponding (revocation list, attribute set) pair (R D , S D ), and the ciphertext is related to the pair (R, A) which satisfies ((S D satisfies A)
If we set the revocation list R and R D as empty, we can get the same definition for key-like decryption blackbox as shown in [13] .
. This is an oracle algorithm that interacts with a key-like decryption blackbox D. Given the public parameter PP, a revocation list R D , a non-empty attribute set S D , and a probability value (lower-bound) , the algorithm runs in time polynomial in λ and 1/ , and outputs an index set K T ⊆ [N ] which identifies the set of malicious users. Note that has to be polynomially related to λ.
The following Tracing Game captures the notion of fully collusion-resistant traceability. In the game, the adversary targets to build a decryption blackbox D that functions as a private decryption key with the pair (R D , S D ) (as the name of key-like decryption blackbox implies) which can decrypt ciphertexts under some (revocation list, access policy) pairs (R, A). The tracing algorithm, on the other side, is designed to extract the index of at least one of the malicious users whose decryption keys have been used for constructing D.
Game TR . The Tracing Game is defined between a challenger and an adversary A as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs Setup(λ, U, N ) and gives the public parameter PP to A. Key Query. For i = 1 to Q, A adaptively submits (k i , S ki ), and the challenger responds with SK ki,S k i . (Key-like) Decryption Blackbox Generation. A outputs a decryption blackbox D associated with a (revocation list, attribute set) pair (
and a non-negligible probability (lowerbound) value . Tracing. The challenger runs Trace
Let K D = {k i |1 ≤ i ≤ Q} be the index set of keys corrupted by the adversary. We say that the adversary A wins the game if the following conditions hold:
1. For any (revocation list, access policy) pair (R, A) which satisfied ((S D satisfies A)
where the probability is taken over the random choices of message M and the random coins of D. A decryption blackbox satisfying this condition is said to be a useful key-like decryption blackbox.
We denote by TRAdv A the probability that adversary A wins this game. Definition 2. An N -user Blackbox Traceable CP-ABE system is traceable if for all polynomial-time adversaries A the advantage TRAdv A is negligible in λ.
3 Augmented R-CP-ABE Definitions
Definitions and Security Models
An Augmented R-CP-ABE (AugR-CP-ABE) system consists of the following four algorithms:
The algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, the attribute universe U, and the number of users N in the system, then runs in polynomial time in λ, and outputs the public parameter PP and a master secret key MSK. KeyGen A (PP, MSK, S) → SK k,S . The algorithm takes as input PP, MSK, and an attribute set S, and outputs a private key SK k,S , which is assigned and identified by a unique index k ∈ [N ]. Encrypt A (PP, M, R, A,k) → CT R,A . The algorithm takes as input PP, a message M , a revocation list R ⊆ [N ], an access policy A over U, and an indexk ∈ [N + 1], and outputs a ciphertext CT R,A . A is included in CT R,A , but the value ofk is not.
The algorithm takes as input PP, a ciphertext CT R,A , and a private key SK k,S . If (k ∈ [N ] \ R) AND (S satisfies A), the algorithm outputs a message M , otherwise it outputs ⊥ indicating the failure of decryption.
Correctness. For any attribute set
Security. The security of AugR-CP-ABE is defined by the following three games, where the first two are for message-hiding, and the third one is for the index-hiding property.
In the first two message-hiding games between a challenger and an adversary A,k = 1 (the first game, Game Setup. The challenger runs Setup A (λ, U, N ) and gives the public parameter PP to A. Phase 1. For t = 1 to Q 1 , A adaptively submits (index, attribute set) pair (k t , S kt ), and the challenger responds with SK kt,S k t , which corresponds to attribute set S kt and is assigned index k t . Challenge. A submits two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 and a (revocation list, access policy) pair (R * , A * ). The challenger flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends
Phase 2. For t = Q 1 + 1 to Q, A adaptively submits (index, attribute set) pair (k t , S kt ), and the challenger responds with SK kt,S k t , which corresponds to attribute set S kt and is assigned index k t . Guess. A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} for b. Game A IH . In the third game, index-hiding game, for any non-empty attribute set S * ⊆ U, we define the strictest access policy as A S * = x∈S * x, and require that an adversary cannot distinguish between an encryption using (A S * , R * ,k) and (A S * , R * ,k + 1) without a private decryption key SKk ,Sk such that (k ∈
The game takes as input a parameterk ∈ [N ] which is given to both the challenger and the adversary A. The game proceeds as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs Setup A (λ, U, N ) and gives the public parameter PP to A. Key Query. For t = 1 to Q, A adaptively submits (index, attribute set) pair (k t , S kt ), and the challenger responds with SK kt,S k t , which corresponds to attribute set S kt and is assigned index k t . Challenge. A submits a message M and a (revocation list, access policy) pair (R * , A * ). The challenger flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends
A wins the game if b = b under the restriction that none of the queried pairs 
The Reduction of Traceable R-CP-ABE to Augmented R-CP-ABE
We now show that an AugR-CP-ABE with message-hiding and index-hiding implies a secure and traceable R-CP-ABE. Let Σ A = (Setup A , KeyGen A , Encrypt A , Decrypt A ) be an AugR-CP-ABE with message-hiding and index-hiding, define Encrypt(PP,
is a R-CP-ABE derived from Σ A . In the following, we show that if Σ A is message-hiding and index-hiding, then Σ is secure. Furthermore, we propose a tracing algorithm Trace for Σ and show that if Σ A is message-hiding and index-hiding, then Σ (equipped with Trace) is traceable.
R-CP-ABE Security
Theorem 1. If Σ A is an AugR-CP-ABE with message-hiding and index-hiding properties, then Σ is a secure and traceable R-CP-ABE.
Proof. Note that Σ is a special case of Σ A where the encryption algorithm always setsk = 1. Hence, Game MH for Σ is identical to Game A MH1 for Σ A , which implies that MHAdv A for Σ in Game MH is equal to MH
R-CP-ABE Traceability
Now we show that if Σ A is message-hiding (in Game A MH N +1 ) and index-hiding, Σ is traceable. As shown in [13] , with the following Trace algorithm [13] , Σ achieves fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceability against key-like decryption blackbox.
Given a key-like decryption blackbox D associated with a non-empty attribute set S D and probability > 0, the tracing algorithm works as follows: 
Theorem 2.
If Σ A is message-hiding and index-hiding, then Σ is traceable using the Trace algorithm against key-like decryption blackbox.
Proof. In the proof sketch below, we show that if the key-like decryption blackbox output by the adversary is a useful one then the traced
with overwhelming probability, which implies that the adversary can win the game Game TR only with negligible probability, i.e., TRAdv A is negligible. Let D be the key-like decryption blackbox output by the adversary, and (R D , S D ) be the (revocation list, attribute set) pair which can be used to describe D. Define
where the probability is taken over the random choice of message M and the random coins of D. We have that p 1 ≥ and p N +1 is negligible. The former follows the fact that D is a useful key-like decryption blackbox, and the later follows that Σ A is message-hiding (in Game A MH N +1 ). Then there must exist somek ∈ [N ] such that pk − pk +1 ≥ /(2N ). By the Chernoff bound it follows that with overwhelming probability,pk −pk +1 ≥ /(4N ). Hence, we have K T = ∅.
For any k t ∈ K T (i.e.,p kt −p kt+1 ≥ 4N ), we know, by Chernoff, that with overwhelming probability
since otherwise, D can be directly used to win the index-hiding game for Σ A . Hence, we have (
An Augmented R-CP-ABE Construction on Prime Order Groups
Now we construct an AugR-CP-ABE scheme on prime order groups, and prove that this AugR-CP-ABE scheme is message-hiding and index-hiding in the standard model. Combined with the results in Section 3.2, we obtain a R-CP-ABE scheme that is fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable in the standard model, fully secure in the standard model, and on prime order groups.
Preliminaries
Before proposing our AugR-CP-ABE construction , we first review some preliminaries.
Bilinear Groups. Let G be a group generator, which takes a security parameter λ and outputs (p, G, G T , e) where p is a prime, G and G T are cyclic groups of order p, and e : G × G → G T is a map such that: (1) (Bilinear) ∀g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ Z p , e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab , (2) (Non-Degenerate) ∃g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order p in G T . We refer to G as the source group and G T as the target group. We assume that group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are efficiently computable, and the description of G and G T includes a generator of G and G T respectively.
Complexity Assumptions. We will base the message-hiding property of our AugR-CP-ABE scheme on the Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN), the Decisional 3-Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption (D3DH) and the Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption, and will base the index-hiding property of our AugR-CP-ABE scheme on the DLIN assumption and the D3DH assumption. Note that the DLIN assumption and the D3DH assumption are standard and generally accepted assumptions, and the Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption is introduced and proved by Lewko and Waters in [12] . Please refer to Appendix A for the details of the three assumptions.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces. Our construction will use dual pairing vector spaces, a tool introduced by Okamoto and Takashima [17, 18, 19] and developed by Lewko [9] and Lewko and Waters [12] . Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be a vector over Z p , the notation g v denotes a tuple of group elements as g v := (g v1 , . . . , g vn ). Furthermore, for any a ∈ Z p and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ Z n p , define
and define a bilinear map e n on n-tuples of G as e n (g v , g
e(g vi , g wi ) = e(g, g) (v·w) , where the dot/inner product v · w is computed modulo p. For a fixed (constant) dimension n, we say two bases B := (b 1 , . . . , b n ) and
where ψ is a non-zero element of Z p . (This is a slight abuse of the terminology "orthonormal", since ψ is not constrained to be 1.) For a generator g ∈ G, we note that e n (g bi , g 
denote choosing a random pair of bases from this set. As our AugR-CP-ABE construction will use dual pairing vector spaces, the security proof will use a lemma and a Subspace Assumption, which are introduced and proved by Lewko and Waters [12] , in the setting of dual pairing vector spaces. Please refer to Appendix A.1 for the details of this lemma and the Subspace Assumption. Here we would like to stress that the Subspace Assumption is implied by DLIN assumption.
To construct our AugR-CP-ABE scheme, we further define a new notation. In particular, for
Note that for any v, w ∈ Z n p , v , w ∈ Z n p , we have
Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS). As in previous work, we use linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS) to express the access policies. An LSSS is a share-generating matrix A whose rows are labeled by attributes via a function ρ. An attribute set S satisfies the LSSS access matrix (A, ρ) if the rows labeled by the attributes in S have the linear reconstruction property, namely, there exist constants {ω i |ρ(i) ∈ S} such that, for any valid shares {λ i } of a secret s, we have ρ(i)∈S ω i λ i = s. The formal definitions of access structures and LSSS can be found in Appendix C.
Notations. Suppose the number of users N in the system equals n 2 for some n 1 , so we use [n, n] instead of [N ] in the following content. We arrange the users in a n × n matrix and uniquely assign a tuple (i, j) where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, to each user. A user at position (i, j) of the matrix has index k = (i − 1) * n + j. For simplicity, we directly use (i, j) as the index where (i, j) ≥ (ī,j) means that ((i >ī) ∨ (i =ī ∧ j ≥j)). The use of pairwise notation (i, j) is purely a notational convenience, as k = (i − 1) * n + j defines a bijection between {(i, j)|1 ≤ i, j ≤ n} and {1, . . . , N }. We conflate the notation and consider the attribute universe to be [U] = {1, 2 . . . , U}, so U serves both as a description of the attribute universe and as a count of the total number of attributes. Given a bilinear group order p, one can randomly choose r x , r y , r z ∈ Z p , and set χ 1 = (r x , 0, r z ), χ 2 = (0, r y , r z ), χ 3 = χ 1 ×χ 2 = (−r y r z , −r x r z , r x r y ). Let span{χ 1 , χ 2 } be the subspace spanned by χ 1 and χ 2 , i.e. span{χ 1 , χ 2 } = {ν 1 χ 1 + ν 2 χ 2 |ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ Z p }. We can see that χ 3 is orthogonal to the subspace span{χ 1 , χ 2 } and that
For any v ∈ span{χ 1 , χ 2 }, we have (χ 3 · v) = 0, and for random v ∈ Z 3 p , (χ 3 · v) = 0 happens with overwhelming probability.
AugR-CP-ABE Construction
The algorithm chooses a bilinear group G of order p and two generators g, h ∈ G. It randomly chooses 
The public parameter PP and the master secret key MSK are set to
In addition, a counter ctr = 0 is implicitly included in MSK. KeyGen A (PP, MSK, S) → SK (i,j),S . The algorithm first sets ctr = ctr + 1 and computes the corresponding index in the form of (i, j) where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and (i − 1) * n + j = ctr. Then it randomly chooses σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 ∈ Z p , and outputs a private key
A is an l × m LSSS matrix and ρ maps each row A k of A to an attribute ρ(k) ∈ [U]. The encryption is for recipients whose (index, attributes set) pair (i, j),
that is,R is the non-revoked index list, andR i is the set of non-revoked column index on the i-th row. The algorithm first chooses random
It also chooses random r x , r y , r z ∈ Z p , and sets χ 1 = (r x , 0, r z ), χ 2 = (0, r y , r z ), χ 3 = χ 1 × χ 2 = (−r y r z , −r x r z , r x r y ). Then it randomly chooses
Let π 1 and π 2 be the first entries of u 1 and u 2 respectively. The algorithm creates a ciphertext R, (A, ρ),
as follows:
-if i <ī: choose randomŝ i ∈ Z p , then set
-if i ≥ī: set
where
.
Note that if (i, j) ∈ R (implying j / ∈R i ), the algorithm cannot produce such aK i,j . The algorithm then computes
as the output message. Assume the ciphertext is generated from message M and index (ī,j), it can be verified that only when (i >ī) or (i =ī ∧ j ≥j), M = M will hold. This follows from the facts that for i >ī, we have (v i · χ 3 ) = 0 (since v i ∈ span{χ 1 , χ 2 }), and for i =ī, we have that (v i · χ 3 ) = 0 happens with overwhelming probability (since v i is randomly chosen from Z Correctness. Assume the ciphertext is generated from revocation list R, message M and index (ī,j). For i ≥ī we have
If i ≥ī ∧ j ≥j: we have
If i =ī ∧ j <j: note that for i =ī, we have that (v i · χ 3 ) = 0 happens with overwhelming probability (since v i is randomly chosen from Z 3 p ), then we have
Note that
Thus from the values of T i , D P and
Security of The AugR-CP-ABE Construction
The following Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 show that our AugR-CP-ABE construction is message-hiding, and Theorem 5 shows that our AugR-CP-ABE construction is index-hiding.
Theorem 3. Suppose the DLIN assumption, the D3DH assumption, and the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption hold. Then no PPT adversary can win Game . Semi-functional Keys. To produce a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of
with index (i, j). One then chooses random value γ. The semi-functional key is
Semi-functional Ciphertexts. To produce a semi-functional ciphertext for an LSSS matrix (A, ρ) of size l×m, one first calls the normal encryption algorithm to produce a normal ciphertext consisting of R, (A, ρ),
∈ Z p and a random vector u 3 ∈ Z m p with first entry equal to π 3 . The semi-functional ciphertext is:
. Our proof is obtained via a hybrid argument over a sequence of games:
Game real : The real message-hiding game (i.e. Game A MH1 ) as defined in the Section 3.1.
Let Q denote the total number of key queries that the attacker makes. For each t from 0 to Q, we define Game t as follows: In Game t , the ciphertext given to the attacker is semi-functional, as are the first t keys. The remaining keys are normal. Game f inal : In this game, all of the keys given to the attacker are semi-functional, and the ciphertext given to the attacker is a semi-functional encryption of a random message.
The outer structure of our hybrid argument will progress as shown in Fig. 1 . First, we transition from Game real to Game 0 , then to Game 1 , next to Game 2 , and so on. We ultimately arrive at Game Q , where the ciphertext and all of the keys given to the attacker are semi-functional. We then transition to Game f inal , which is defined to be like Game Q , except that the ciphertext given to the attacker is a semi-functional encryption of a random message. This will complete our proof, since any attacker has a zero advantage in this final game.
The transitions from Game real to Game 0 and from Game Q to Game f inal are relatively easy, and can be accomplished directly via computational assumptions. The transitions from Game t−1 to Game t require more intricate arguments. For these steps, we will need to treat Phase 1 key requests (before the challenge ciphertext) and Phase 2 key requests (after the challenge ciphertext) differently. We will also need to define two additional types of semi-functional keys:
Nominal Semi-functional Keys. To produce a nominal semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of
The nominal semi-functional key is:
We note that a nominal semifunctional key still correctly decrypts a semi-functional ciphertext. Temporary Semi-functional Keys. A temporary semi-functional key is similar to a nominal semi-functional key, except that the semi-functional component attached to K i,j will now be randomized (this will prevent correct decryption of a semi-functional ciphertext) and K i,j , K i,j and {K i,j,j } j ∈[n]\{j} change accordingly. More formally, to produce a temporary semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of
The temporary semifunctional key is formed as:
For each t from 1 to Q, we define the following additional games:
This is like Game t , except that the t th key given to the attacker is a nominal semi-functional key. The first t − 1 keys are still semi-functional in the original sense, while the remaining keys are normal. Game T t : This is like Game t , except that the t th key given to the attacker is a temporary semi-functional key. The first t − 1 keys are still semi-functional in the original sense, while the remaining keys are normal.
In order to transfer from Game t−1 to Game t in our hybrid argument, we will transition first from Game t−1 to Game N t , then to Game T t , and finally to Game t . The transition from Game N t to Game T t will require different computational assumptions for Phase 1 and Phase 2 queries (As shown in Fig. 1 , we use two lemmas based on different assumptions to obtain the transition).
As shown in Fig. 1 , we use a series of lemmas, i.e. Lemmas 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, to prove the transitions. The details of these lemmas and their proofs can be found in Appendix B.1. Proof. In Game A IH , the adversary A will eventually behave in one of two different ways:
Case I: In Key Query phase, A will not submit ((ī,j), S (ī,j) ) for some attribute set S (ī,j) to query the corresponding private key. In Challenge phase, A submits a message M and a non-empty attribute set S * . There is not any restriction on S * . Case II: In Key Query phase, A will submit ((ī,j), S (ī,j) ) for some attribute set S (ī,j) to query the corresponding private key. In Challenge phase, A submits a message M and a non-empty attribute set S * with the restriction that the corresponding strictest access policy A S * is not satisfied by S (ī,j) . Case II has the following sub-cases:
We flip a random coin c ∈ {0, 1} as our guess on which case that A is in. In particular, if c = 0, we guess that A is in Case I, Case II.1 or Case II.2. In this case, it follows the restriction in the index-hiding game for Augmented Broadcast Encryption (AugBE) in [6] , where the adversay does not query the key with index (ī,j) or (ī,j) is not in the receiver list [n, n] \ R * . If c = 1, we guess that A is in Case I, Case II.2 or Case II.3, which means that the adversary does not query the key with index (ī,j) or the attributes set S (ī,j) does not satisfy A * . As of the fully secure CP-ABE schemes in [10, 19, 11, 12, 13] , we assume that the size of attribute universe (i.e. |U|) is polynomial in the security parameter λ, so that a degradation of O(1/|U|) in the security reduction is acceptable. The proof details of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 2. Suppose the D3DH assumption and the DLIN assumption hold. Then for any 1 ≤ī ≤ n no PPT adversary can distinguish between an encryption to (ī, n) and (ī + 1, 1) in Game A IH with non-negligible advantage.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from a series of lemmas that establish the indistinguishability of the following games, where "less-than row" implies the corresponding v i is randomly chosen from Z 3 p and T i is a random element (i.e. T i = e(g, g)ŝ i ), "target row" implies the corresponding v i is randomly chosen from Z 3 p and T i is well-formed, and "greater-than row" implies the corresponding v i is randomly chosen from span{χ 1 , χ 2 } and T i is well-formed.
-H 1 : Encrypt to column n, rowī is the target row, rowī + 1 is the greater-than row. -H 2 : Encrypt to column n + 1, rowī is the target row, rowī + 1 is the greater-than row. -H 3 : Encrypt to column n + 1, rowī is the less-than row, rowī + 1 is the greater-than row (no target row). -H 4 : Encrypt to column 1, rowī is the less-than row, rowī + 1 is the greater-than row (no target row). -H 5 : Encrypt to column 1, rowī is the less-than row, rowī + 1 is the target row.
It can be observed that game H 1 corresponds to the encryption being done to (ī, n) and game H 5 corresponds to encryption to (ī + 1, 1). As shown in Fig. 2 , we use a series of lemmas, i.e. Lemmas 10, 11, 12, and 13, to prove the indistinguishability of the games H 1 and H 5 . The details of these lemmas and their proofs can be found in Appendix B. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new Augmented R-CP-ABE construction on prime order groups, and proved its message-hiding and index-hiding properties in the standard model. This CP-ABE achieves full security in the standard model on prime order groups. Our contributions are (1)adding the revocation list, and (2)proving its full security with revocability. We follow the proof method in [16] for message-hiding, and build two direct reductions for the proof for index-hiding. The scheme is a fully collusion-resistant blackbox traceable R-CP-ABE scheme. It achieves the most efficient level to date, with the overhead in O( √ N ) only.
A Assumptions
The Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN) Given a group generator G, define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption to be:
We say that G satisfies the DLIN Assumption if Adv DL G,A is a negligible function of the security parameter λ for any PPT algorithm A.
The Decisional 3-Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption (D3DH) Given a group generator G, define the following distribution:
We say that G satisfies the D3DH Assumption if Adv
is a negligible function of the security parameter λ for any PPT algorithm A.
The Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption [12] Given a group generator G and a positive integer q, define the following distribution:
We say that G satisfies the Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption if Adv 
is also distributed as a random sample from Dual(Z n p , ψ). In particular, the distribution of (B A , B * A ) is independent of A. The "Subspace Assumption" is introduced by Lewko [9] , and is generalized by Lewko and Waters [12] . In particular, let the parameter m denote the number of bases, and each basis pair has its own dimension n i and its own parameter k i where k i is a positive integer such that k i ≤ ni 3 . The following statement of the subspace assumption is implied by DLIN assumption, and is proved by Lewko and Waters [12, Appendix A] . Note that this reduction (i.e., the Subspace Assumption is implied by DLIN assumption) holds for any valid choices of the parameters m, n i , k i . We refer to [12] for more details of the following statement of the subspace assumption.
The m dual orthonormal bases pairs will be denoted by ( [12] ) Given a group generator G, define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT adversary A (with output in {0, 1}),
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
B Proofs

B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 4. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game real and Game 0 .
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game real and Game 0 , we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with parameters m = U + 2, n i = 3, k i = 1 for two values of i, and n i = 6, k i = 2 for the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the assumption with the notation of our construction as conveniently as possible, we will denote the bases involved in the assumption by (D,
. B is given (we will ignore the U terms and µ 3 because they will not be needed):
The exponents of the unknown terms Setup. B implicitly sets the bases for the construction as:
. We note that these are properly distributed because (D, D * ), (D 0 , D * 0 ), etc. are randomly chosen (up to sharing the same ψ value). B chooses random exponents
Then B gives to A the following public parameter:
Note that B implicitly sets
Phase 1. To respond to a query for ((i, j), S (i,j) ), B produces a normal key as follows. It randomly chooses σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 ∈ Z p , and outputs a private key
Challenge. A submits to B a revocation list R, an LSSS matrix (A, ρ) of size l × m and two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 , B produces the challenge ciphertext for index (ī = 1,j = 1) as follows. B first chooses random
where the first entries of u 1 and u 2 are equal to 0. It also chooses a random vector u ∈ Z p with first entry equal to 1, and chooses random exponents ξ 1,3 , . . . , ξ l,3 ∈ Z p . B implicitly sets
as follows (note thatī = 1,j = 1): 1. For each i ∈ [n]: it sets
Phase 2. Same with Phase 1.
If the exponents of the T terms do not include the τ 3 terms, then Q i and P 0 are in their normal forms, and the exponent vector of P k is
Thus we have a properly distributed normal ciphertext in this case.
If the exponents of the T terms do include the τ 3 terms, then Q i and P 0 are in their semi-functional forms with π 3 = τ 3 , and the exponent vector of P k is
This is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext with u 3 = τ 3 u and ξ k,3 = τ 3 ξ k,3 . (Note that these values are distributed randomly and independently from u 1 , u 2 , ξ k,1 , ξ k,2 .) Thus, when the τ 3 terms are absent, B properly simulates Game real , and when the τ 3 terms are present, B properly simulates Game 0 . As a result, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to gain a non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
Lemma 5. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game t−1 and Game N t for any t from 1 to Q.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game t−1 and Game N t , we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with parameters m = U + 2, n i = 3, k i = 1 for two values of i, and n i = 6, k i = 2 for the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the assumption with the notation of our construction as
The exponents of the unknown terms T 1 , T 
Phase 1. To respond to a query for ((i, j), S (i,j) ), B acts as follows.
-If it is in the first t − 1 key queries, B generates a semi-functional key as follow. B randomly chooses δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 , σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , γ ∈ Z p , and outputs a private key
Note that this is a properly distributed semi-functional key with implicitly setting σ i,j,1 = ησ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 = βσ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 = ηδ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 = βδ i,j,2 .
-If it is the t th key query: B randomly chooses δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 , δ i,j,3 ∈ Z p , and outputs a private key
If the exponents of the T terms do not include the τ 3 terms, then this is a properly distributed normal key. If they do include the τ 3 terms, then this is a properly distributed nominal semi-functional key with σ i,j,3 = τ 3 and δ i,j,3 = δ i,j,3 τ 3 . (Note that these values are distributed randomly and independently from σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 .) -If it is in the {t + 1, . . . , Q} key queries: B generates a normal key as follows. B randomly chooses δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 , σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 ∈ Z p , and outputs a private key
as:
Note that this is a properly distributed normal key with implicitly setting σ i,j,1 = ησ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 = βσ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 = ηδ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 = βδ i,j,2 .
Challenge. A submits to B a revocation list R, an LSSS matrix (A, ρ) of size l × m and two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 , B produces a semi-functional ciphertext for index (ī = 1,j = 1) as follows. B first chooses random κ, τ, s 1 , . . . , s n , t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Z p ,
where the first entries of u 1 and u 2 are equal to 0. It also chooses a random vector u ∈ Z m p with first entry equal to 1, and chooses random exponents ξ 1,3 , . . . , ξ l,3 ∈ Z p . B implicitly sets
B chooses random r x , r y , r z ∈ Z p , and sets χ 1 = (r x , 0, r z ), χ 2 = (0, r y , r z ), χ 3 = χ 1 ×χ 2 = (−r y r z , −r x r z , r x r y ), then it chooses random v 1 ∈ Z 3 p , span{χ 1 , χ 2 } f or i = 2, . . . , n. B chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1}, then creates a ciphertext R, (A, ρ),
as follows (note thatī = 1,j = 1):
For each i ∈ [n]: it sets
Thus, when the τ 3 terms are absent, B properly simulates Game t−1 , and when the τ 3 terms are present, B properly simulates Game N t . As a result, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to gain a non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
Lemma 6. Under the D3DH assumption, no PPT attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game N t and Game T t for any t from 1 to Q 1 (recall these are all the Phase 1 queries).
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game N t and Game T t from some t between 1 and Q 1 , we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the D3DH assumption. B is given g, g x , g y , g z , T , where T is either g xyz or a random element of G. B will simulate either Game 
We note (B, B * ) and (B 0 , B * 0 ) are properly distributed. B sets the normal portions of (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) as follows:
The semi-functional portions of these bases will be set later (at which point we may verify that all of (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) are properly distributed). B chooses θ, α 1 , α 2 , r i , α i,1 , α i,2 , z i (i ∈ [n]), c j,1 , c j,2 , y j , υ j (j ∈ [n]) ∈ Z p randomly. We observe that B can now produce the public parameter (with h = g θ , {h j = g υj } j∈[n] ), and also know the master secret key (enabling it to create normal keys). It gives the public parameter to A. Phase 1. To create the first t − 1 semi-functional keys in response to A's key requests, B first creates a normal key, then chooses a random exponent γ ∈ Z p , and multiples
respectively. We are using here that B does not need to know g
precisely in order to create well-distributed semi-functional keys -it suffices for B to know g cb * 3 for some (non-zero) c ∈ Z p . A requests the t th key for some pair ((i t , j t ), S (it,jt) ) where S (it,jt) ⊆ [U]. At this point, B implicitly defines the semi-functional parts of the bases (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) as follows (note that these have not been involved in the game before this):
We observe that all of (B, B * ), (B 0 , B * 0 ), (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) are properly distributed, and their distribution is independent of x, y, and S (it,jt) (the involvement of x, y, and S (it,jt) is only present in B's view and is information-theoretically hidden from A, see [12, Lemma 11] ). To create the t th key, B chooses random exponents σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 , δ i,j,3 ∈ Z p , then forms the key as
If T = g xyz , this is a properly distributed nominal semi-functional key with σ i,j,3 = z, δ i,j,3 = (xy) −1 δ i,j,3 . Otherwise, this is a properly distributed temporary semi-functional key. Challenge. At some later point, A submits B a revocation list R, an LSSS matrix (A, ρ) of size l × m and two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 , B produces a semi-functional ciphertext for index (ī = 1,j = 1) as follows. Note that S (it,jt) does not satisfy (A, ρ), B first computes a vector w ∈ Z m p that has first entry equal to 1 and is orthogonal to all of the rows A k of A such that ρ(k) ∈ S (it,jt) (such a vector must exist since S (it,jt) fails to satisfy (A, ρ), and it is efficiently computable). B also chooses a random vector u 3 ∈ Z m p subject to the constraint that the first entry is zero. It implicitly sets π 3 = xy and sets u 3 = xyw + xu 3 . We note that π 3 is random because all of the dual orthonormal bases are distributed independently of x, y, and u 3 is distributed as a random vector with first entry equal to π 3 . B also chooses random values ξ k,3 ∈ Z p for all k such that ρ(k) ∈ S (it,jt) and random values ξ k,3 ∈ Z p for all k such that ρ(k) / ∈ S (it,jt) . For values of k such that ρ(k) / ∈ S (it,jt) , it implicitly sets ξ k,3 = xξ k,3 . B can then produce the semi-functional components of the ciphertext as it can compute:
Here we have used the fact that A k · w ≡ 0 mod p to avoid needing to produce a multiple of g xyd ρ(k),5 for k such that ρ(k) ∈ S (it,jt) . Note that h = g θ and B knows the value of θ, B can produce the semi-functional components using the value of θ and the above values. Then it multiplies these semi-functional components by the normal components to form the semi-functional ciphertext, which is given to A. Phase 2. B can respond to A's key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm.
If T = g xyz , then B has properly simulated Game N t , and if T is a random group element, then B has properly simulated Game T t . Thus, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to gain a non-negligible advantage against the D3DH assumption.
Lemma 7.
Under the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption, no PPT attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game N t and Game T t for some t such that Q 1 < t ≤ Q using an access matrix with dimensions ≤ q, we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption. B is given:
, j = j , and T , where T is either equal to g dc q+1 or is a random element of G. B will simulate either Game 
The semi-functional portions of these bases will be set later (at which point we may verify that all of (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) are properly distributed).
We observe that B can now produce the public parameter (with h = g θ , {h j = g υj } j∈[n] ), and also know the master secret key (enabling it to create normal keys). It gives the public parameter to A. Phase 1. To create the first Q 1 semi-functional keys in response to A's key requests, B first creates a normal key, then chooses a random exponent γ ∈ Z p , and multiples 
At this point, B implicitly sets the semi-functional portions of the bases (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) as follows (note that these have played no role in the game before this point):
We observe that all of (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) are properly distributed. B produces a semi-functional ciphertext for index (ī = 1,j = 1) as follows. To create the challenge ciphertext, B first creates a normal ciphertext using the normal encryption algorithm. To create the semi-functional components, it implicitly sets π 3 = cdf . It also chooses random values u 2 , . . . , u m ∈ Z p and random values ξ k,3 ∈ Z p for each k ∈ [l]. It implicitly sets u 3 = (cdf, df c 2 + u 2 , . . . , df c m + u m ). 2 This is distributed as a random vector with first entry equal to
. These are distributed as uniformly random elements because each ξ k,3 is random and η ρ(k) = 0 (with all but negligible probability). We observe:
2 Note that this is assuming that m ≥ 2. For the case of m = 1, we will set u3 = (cdf ), σi,j,3 = w1c q , and δi,j,3 = f c −1 δ i,j,3 , and it can be verified that the following proof follows as well.
By definition, k ∈ J ρ(k) , so we have some cancelation here:
We now see that B can compute g A k ·u3+ξ k,3 using the terms it is given in the assumption, enabling it to produce
We also see that
so B can also produce g −ξ k,3 b ρ(k), 6 . In this way, B can produce the semi-functional component of P k for each k ∈ [l] with the proper distribution, as h = g θ and B knows the value of θ. B also produces the semi-functional components of Q i and P 0 as it can compute:
It gives the resulting properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext to A. Phase 2. To create the Q th 1 , . . . , (t − 1)
th semi-functional keys in response to A's key requests, B first creates a normal key, then chooses a random exponent γ ∈ Z p , and multiples
respectively. As in the proof of the previous lemma, we note here that B does not need to know g b * 3 precisely in order to create well-distributed semi-functional keys. A requests the t th key for some pair ((i t , j t ), S (it,jt) ) where
. B can create the normal parts of the key using the normal key generation algorithm. To create the semi-functional parts, B proceeds as follows. Since S (it,jt) does not satisfy (A, ρ), B can (efficiently) compute a vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) ∈ Z m p such that its first entry is non-zero and w is orthogonal (modulo p) to all rows A k of A such that ρ(k) ∈ S (it,jt) . We may assume the first entry of w is randomized. B implicitly sets σ i,j,3 = w 1 c q + · · · + w m c q−m+1 , which is properly distributed because w 1 is random (and c is non-zero with all but negligible probability). B also chooses a random value δ i,j,3 and implicitly sets δ i,j,3 = −w 2 c
. This is properly distributed because δ i,j,3 is random (and f c −1 is non-zero with all but negligible probability). We observe that
B forms the semi-functional part of K i,j as:
, this is equal to g (σi,j,3+δi,j,3)b * 3 , as required for a nominal semi-functional key. Otherwise, this exponent is distributed as a random multiple of b * 3 , as required for a temporary semi-functional key. B forms the semi-functional parts of K i,j , K i,j and
enabling B to produce g δi,j,3b * 0,3 using the terms given in the assumption. Now, B can also produce g σi,j,3 , and hence can compute g σi,j,3b * x,5 = g σi,j,3d * x,5 for each x ∈ S it,jt . We observe
, and
For each k ∈ J x , we have ρ(k) = x. So for x ∈ S (it,jt) , we have A k · w = 0 modulo p for every k ∈ J x . Thus, all of the terms involving c q+1 cancel, and we are left with terms that can be created in the exponent from the group elements given in the assumption (note that m ≤ q, so 2q is an upper bound on the powers of c involved here). This shows that B can create g σi,j,3b * x,6 for all x ∈ S (it,jt) , and hence can produce properly distributed semi-functional components for each K i,j,x of the t th key. B can respond to the rest of A's key requests by producing normal keys via the normal key generation algorithm.
If
between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage against the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption.
Lemma 8. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game T t and Game t for any t from 1 to Q.
Proof. This proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 5, except that B adds an additional terms of g (θ+υj )γb * 3 , g γb * 3 , g ziγb * 3 and g υ j γb * 3 to K i,j , K i,j , K i,j and {K i,j,j } j ∈[n]\{j} respectively for the t th key (where it chooses γ ∈ Z p randomly). This ensures that when the τ 3 terms are not present, the t th key will be a properly distributed semi-functional key.
Lemma 9. Under the subspace assumption, no PPT attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game Q and Game f inal .
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game Q and Game f inal , we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with parameters m = U + 2, n i = 3, k i = 1 for two values of i, and n i = 6, k i = 2 for the rest of the values of i. To coincide with our notation for the construction, we will denote the bases involved in the assumption by (B,
. B is given (we will ignore µ 3 and T 0,1 , {T x,1 , T x,2 } x∈[U ] because they do not be needed):
The exponent of the unknown term T 1 is distributed either as
It is B's task to determine if this τ 3 contribution is present or not. 
Phase 1. To respond to a query for ((i, j), S (i,j) ), B generates a semi-functional key as follow. B randomly chooses δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 , σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , γ ∈ Z p , and outputs a private key
Note that this is a properly distributed semi-functional key with implicitly setting
We note that the multiple of b * 3 appearing in the exponent of
\{j} , resp.) is either equal to γ ( γ , z i γ , γ , resp.) or γ + τ 3 (γ + τ 3 , z i (γ + τ 3 ), γ + τ 3 , resp.), depending on the nature of T 1 . Either way, this is a properly distributed semi-functional key (whose distribution is independent of τ 3 even if it is present). Challenge. A submits B a revocation list R, an LSSS matrix (A, ρ) of size l×m and two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 . To create the semi-functional ciphertext B can use the same procedure employed in the proof of Lemma 5 to use the U terms to provide the semi-functional components. We repeat the description of this procedure below for the reader's convenience. The only difference here comes in computing the blinding factor for T i . B produces a semi-functional ciphertext for index (ī = 1,j = 1) as follows. B first chooses random
B chooses random r x , r y , r z ∈ Z p , and sets χ 1 = (r x , 0, r z ), χ 2 = (0, r y , r z ), χ 3 = χ 1 ×χ 2 = (−r y r z , −r x r z , r x r y ), then it chooses random
If the exponent of T 1 is equal to τ 1 ηb * 1 + τ βb * 2 then we have
and hence we have a properly distributed semi-functional encryption of M b , as required in Game Q . If instead the exponent of T 1 is equal to τ 1 ηb * 1 + τ βb * 2 + τ 3 b * 3 , then we have
Since τ 3 is random (and independent of the semi-functional keys and the rest of the ciphertext), this blinding factor is distributed as a freshly random group element of G T . Therefore the ciphertext is distributed as a semi-functional encryption of a random message, as required in Game f inal . Phase 2. Same with Phase 1.
Thus, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to achieve a nonnegligible advantage against the subspace assumption.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks the Index Hiding Game with advantage . We build a simulator B to solve a D3DH problem instance. B flips a random coin ∈ {0, 1}, if c = 0, B interacts with A in Case A as guessing "A is not in Case II.3", otherwise B interacts with A in Case B as guessing "A is not in Case II.1".
Case A: B receives the D3DH challenge from the challenger as ((p, G, G T , e), g, A = g a , B = g b , C = g c , T ), and it is expected to guess if T is g abc or if it is random. In this case, the simulator guess the challenge valuec and generates the public parameters correctly. In case the value of thec does not match the value later provided by the adversary then the simulation aborts. Since the simulator will successfully guess the right value ofc with probability at least 1 2 , the simulation will work with probability at least 
We note (B, B * ), (B 0 , B * 0 ) and {(B x , B * x )} are properly distributed. B chooses random exponents
B gives A the following public parameter PP:
Note that B implicitly chooses rī, cj ,1 , cj ,2 , υ j and yj ∈ Z p such that
Key Query. To respond to a query for ((i, j),
-if (i, j) = (ī,j): it means that A behaves in Case II.1 or Case II.2. B chooses random σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 ∈ Z p and sets the value of σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 by implicitly setting
Challenge. A submits a revocation list R * , a message M and an attribute set S * , B setsR * = [n, n] \ R * and constructs the LSSS matrix (A, ρ) for A S * . Let l × m be the size of A. 
. Then B continues the following interaction.
B chooses random τ , s 1 , . . . , sī −1 , s ī , sī +1 , . . . , s n , t 1 , . . . , tī −1 , tī, tī +1 , . . . , t n ∈ Z p ,
where the first entries of u 1 , u 2 are equal to zero. B chooses random r x , r y , r z ∈ Z p , and sets χ 1 = (r x , 0, r z ), χ 2 = (0, r y , r z ), χ 3 = χ 1 ×χ 2 = (−r y r z , −r x r z , r x r y ), then it chooses random
B chooses random (ν c,1 , ν c,2 , ν c,3 ) ∈ Z 
-if i <ī: it chooses randomŝ i ∈ Z p , and sets
-if i =ī: it sets
-if i >ī: it sets
-if j <j: it chooses random µ j ∈ Z p and implicitly sets the value of µ j such that (
-if j =j:
-if j >j:
If T = g abc , then the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index (ī,j). If T is randomly chosen, say T = g r for some random r ∈ Z p , the ciphertext is a well-formed encryption to the index (ī,j + 1) with implicitly setting µj such that ( 
. We note (B, B * ), (B 0 , B * 0 ) and {(B x , B * x )} are properly distributed. B chooses random exponents
Note that B implicitly chooses rī, cj ,1 , cj ,2 , yj ∈ Z p and {z i ∈ Z p } i∈[n]\{ī} such that
Key Query. To respond to a query for ((i, j), S (i,j) ), -if (i, j) = (ī,j): B randomly chooses σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 ∈ Z p , then creates a private key (i, j), S (i,j) ,
and outputs a random b ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger. Otherwise B chooses random σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 ∈ Z p and sets the value of σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 by implicitly setting
where 
For each j ∈ [n]:
3.
B. Proof. This lemma can be proved by applying the result of Lemma 1.
Lemma 11. If the D3DH assumption holds, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between games H 2 and H 3 with non-negligible probability.
Proof. Consider an adversary A that can distinguish between H 2 and H 3 with a probability greater than . We build an algorithm B that uses A to solve the D3DH problem. B receives the D3DH challenge as ((p, G, G T , e) , g, A = g a , B = g b , C = g c , T ), and it is expected to guess if T is g abc or if it is random. B interacts with A in the Game IH as follows:
Setup. B randomly chooses two pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B, B * ), (B 0 , B * 0 ) of dimension 3 and U pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) of dimension 6, subject to the constraint that all of these share the same value of ψ. B also randomly chooses
B sets the public parameters to
Key Query. To respond to a query for ((i, j), S (i,j) ), B randomly chooses σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 ∈ Z p , then creates a private key as
Challenge. A submits a message M , a revocation list R and an attribute set S * . B constructs the LSSS matrix (A, ρ) for A S * . Let l × m be the size of A. B chooses random κ, τ, s 1 , . . . , s n , t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Z p ,
where the first entries of u 1 and u 2 are equal to π 1 and π 2 respectively. B chooses random r x , r y , r z ∈ Z p , and sets χ 1 = (r x , 0, r z ), χ 2 = (0, r y , r z ), χ 3 = χ 1 ×χ 2 = (−r y r z , −r x r z , r x r y ), then it chooses random v i ∈ Z p f or i = 1, . . . ,ī, v i ∈ span{χ 1 , χ 2 } f or i =ī + 1, . . . , n.
B chooses random (ν c,1 , ν c,2 , ν c,3 ) ∈ Z -if i <ī: it chooses randomŝ i ∈ Z p , and sets
T i = e(g, g)ŝ i .
-if i =ī: it sets 2. For each j ∈ [n]: Since j < n + 1, B chooses random µ j ∈ Z p and implicitly sets the value of µ j such that µ j = µ j − cν c,3 , then sets
. If T corresponds to g abc , then the encryption corresponds to game H 2 ; and if T is randomly chosen, then the encryption corresponds to game H 3 . Guess. A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} to B, then B outputs this b to the challenger.
The advantage of B is exactly equal to the advantage of the adversary A.
Lemma 12. If the D3DH assumption holds, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between games H 3 and H 4 with non-negligible probability. Proof. H 3 to H 4 can be expressed as a series of games H 3,n+1 , H 3,n , . . . , H 3,1 . In the game H 3,ĵ all column ciphertexts (C j , C j ) are well-formed for all j such thatĵ ≤ j ≤ n. It can be seen that H 3,1 is the same as H 4 , and H 3,n+1 is the same as H 3 . We prove the indistinguishability of games H 3,ĵ and H 3,ĵ+1 for allĵ where 1 ≤ĵ ≤ n. The proof for this is similar to that of Lemma 1.
Consider an adversary A that solves the index hiding game with a probability greater than . The adversary is considered successful if it can distinguish between games H 3,ĵ and H 3,ĵ+1 . We build an algorithm B that uses A to solve the D3DH problem. B receives the D3DH challenge as ((p, G, G T , e), g, A = g a , B = g b , C = g c , T ), and it is expected to guess if T is g abc or if it is random. B interacts with A in the Game IH as follows:
Setup. B randomly chooses two pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B, B * ), (B 0 , B * 0 ) of dimension 3 and U pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) of dimension 6, subject to the constraint that all of these share the same value of ψ. B also randomly chooses θ, α 1 , α 2 ∈ Z p , {r i , z i , α i,1 , α i,2 ∈ Z p } i∈[n] , {c j,1 , c j,2 , y j , ∈ Z p } j∈[n]\{ĵ} , c ĵ ,1 , c ĵ ,2 , y ĵ ∈ Z p , {υ j ∈ Z p } j∈ [n] .
B sets the public parameter to Setup. B randomly chooses two pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B, B * ), (B 0 , B * 0 ) of dimension 3 and U pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . . , (B U , B * U ) of dimension 6, subject to the constraint that all of these share the same value of ψ. B also randomly chooses θ, α 1 , α 2 ∈ Z p , {r i , z i , α i,1 , α i,2 ∈ Z p } i∈ [n] , {c j,1 , c j,2 , y j , υ j ∈ Z p } j∈ [n] . Key Query. To respond to a query for ((i, j), S (i,j) ), B randomly chooses σ i,j,1 , σ i,j,2 , δ i,j,1 , δ i,j,2 ∈ Z p , then creates a private key as Challenge. A submits a revocation list R, a message M and an attribute set S * . B constructs the LSSS matrix (A, ρ) for A S * . Let l × m be the size of A. B chooses random κ, τ, s 1 , . . . , s n , t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Z p , v c , w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ Z 3 p , ξ 1,1 , ξ 1,2 , . . . , ξ l,1 , ξ l,2 ∈ Z p , u 1 , u 2 ∈ Z m p , where the first entries of u 1 and u 2 are equal to π 1 and π 2 respectively. B implicitly sets χ 1 = (a, 0, c), χ 2 = (0, b, c), χ 3 = χ 1 × χ 2 = (−bc, −ac, ab). Note that a valid DLIN tuple will lie in the subspace formed by vectors χ 1 and χ 2 . In the following, a DLIN problem tuple will be used for setting row ciphertext for rowī + 1. A valid tuple leads to encryption as in game H 4 , and a random tuple will cause the encryption to be as in game H 5 . B creates a ciphertext R, (A, ρ), 
-if i =ī + 1: B implicitly chooses v i ∈ Z 3 p such the g vi = (g ax , g by , T ). Since B knows the values of b 1 , b 2 , and v c , it can compute the value of (g b1+b2 ) vi and g (vi·vc) . Then it sets .
-if i >ī + 1: it chooses random v i ∈ span{χ 1 , χ 2 }, i.e., chooses random ν i,1 , ν i,2 ∈ Z p and sets v i = ν i,1 χ 1 + ν i,2 χ 2 . B cannot compute the value of v i , but it can compute the value of g vi , i. 2. For each j ∈ [n]: since j ≥ 1, B sets
If T corresponds to g c(x+y) , then the encryption corresponds to game H 4 ; and if T is randomly chosen, then it corresponds to game H 5 . Guess. A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} to B, then B outputs this b to the challenger.
C Access Structure and Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes Definition 6. (Access Structure) [23] Let P be a set of attributes. A collection A ⊆ 2 P is monotone if ∀B, C : B ∈ A and B ⊆ C imply C ∈ A. An access structure (resp., monotone access structure) is a collection (resp., monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of P, i.e., A ⊆ 2 P \ {∅}. The sets in A are called authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called unauthorized sets. Also, for an attribute set S ⊆ P, if S ∈ A then we say S satisfies the access structure A, otherwise we say S does not satisfy A.
As shown in [2] , any monotonic access structure can be realized by a linear secret sharing scheme. 2. There exists a matrix A called the share-generating matrix for Π. The matrix A has l rows and n columns.
For i = 1, . . . , l, the i th row A i of A is labeled by an attribute ρ(i) (ρ is a function from {1, . . . , l} to P). When we consider the column vector v = (s, r 2 , . . . , r n ), where s ∈ Z p is the secret to be shared and r 2 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p are randomly chosen, then Av is the vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share λ i = (Av) i , i.e., the inner product A i · v, belongs to attribute ρ(i).
Also shown in [2] , every LSSS as defined above enjoys the linear reconstruction property, which is defined as follows: Suppose that Π is an LSSS for access structure A. Let S ∈ A be an authorized set, and I ⊂ {1, . . . , l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. There exist constants {ω i ∈ Z p } i∈I such that i∈I ω i A i = (1, 0, . . . , 0), so that if {λ i } are valid shares of a secret s according to Π, i∈I ω i λ i = s. Furthermore, these constants {ω i } can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix A. For any unauthorized set, no such constants exist.
